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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE DEFINITION OF MIRANDA'S INTERROGATION-RHODE ISLAND v. INNIS, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of any issue regarding interrogation must begin with
the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,' which established procedural safeguards to prevent self-incrimination by persons subjected
to arrest and detainment by police. These "Miranda warnings" were
designed to protect an individual from incriminating himself, either inadvertantly or through duress, in a police dominated atmosphere. 2 The
Supreme Court found the basis for these safeguards in the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that
"[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself," and in the sixth amendment which requires
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was a consolidation of four cases before the
United States Supreme Court dealing with the admissibility of statements obtained
from an individual who was subjected to custodial police interrogation. The Court emphasized the necessity for procedures which would assure that the individual is accorded his privilege against self-incrimination. In Miranda, the petitioner was arrested at
his home and taken into custody at a Phoenix, Arizona, police station, where he was
questioned by the police for two hours. As a result of the interrogation, a written confession was signed by the petitioner. A paragraph was typed at the top of the confession stating that the confession was given voluntarily, without threats or promises by
the police, and was made with full knowledge of the defendant's legal rights. This confession was introduced at the defendant's trial over the objection of the defense
counsel, along with other evidence of oral statements made by the defendant during
the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape, and was sentenced
to twenty to thirty years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed the convictions, and held that Miranda's constitutional rights had not
been violated by the police in obtaining the confession. Miranda v. Arizona, 98 Ariz. 18,
401 P.2d 721 (1965). The court relied heavily on the fact that Miranda had not specifically requested counsel.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's decision.
The record showed that Miranda had not been informed of his right to an attorney and
the right to have an attorney present during interrogation. Similarly, the evidence
showed that his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself was not effectively
protected in any other manner. In its opinion, the Supreme Court spelled out the now
familiar procedural safeguards required to be given to, and understood by, the accused
before the prosecution may use any statements made by him that stem from custodial
interrogations. These procedural safeguards are: (1) that an accused has the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him;
and (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The Supreme Court also alluded to the fact that once the accused has exercised his right to silence, all interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
2. Id.
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The maxim implicit in the fifth amendment, nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare, or no one is bound to accuse himself, came into existence as
a result of the early methods of interrogation in England which assumed an inquisitorial character, and the efforts of the Framers to prevent
such methods from becoming entrenched in American jurisprudence. 3
Although times have changed since physical force was used to extract
confessions from an accused, other subtle, but equally effective,
psychological tactics are still in existence and are harder to remove
from the investigative process.' The use of these psychological ploys
led the Supreme Court to include such tactics in the Miranda concept
of interrogation. In Miranda, the Court expressed a concern for "this
[psychological] interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring." 5
This casenote will analyze the Supreme Court's holding in Rhode
Island v. Innis' in which the Court defined the term "interrogation" as
used in Miranda. The casenote begins with the relevant factual position and the Court's holding, followed by an analysis of that holding.

II.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On January 12, 1975, a taxicab driver in Providence, Rhode
Island, was robbed and murdered. 7 On January 17, 1975, a second
taxicab driver was robbed at gunpoint but escaped harm and subsequently identified the defendant, Innis, as his assailant. 8 This identification was made from a picture on the police station bulletin
board. 9 At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the night of this robbery, the
defendant was spotted by a Providence patrolman who arrested him
and read him his "Miranda rights.""0 Within minutes of the arrest, a
3. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). In Brown, the Supreme Court was
asked to rule on the alleged incompatibility of the fifth amendment clause declaring
that no person "shall be compelled ... to be a witness against himself," and the act of

Congress of February 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 stat. 443, which provided that "no person
shall be excused from attending and testifying . . .before the Interstate Commerce

Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission .... on the ground
or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required
of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture."
The Court traced the privilege against self-incrimination from England, where the
maxim was a rule of evidence, to enactment in the federal constitution and inclusion in
the fundamental law present in the minds of the American colonists.
4. F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2nd ed.
1967) [hereinafter cited as INBAU & REID]. Police manuals and texts stress maximizing
the use of privacy and isolation in interrogation methods.
5. 384 U.S. at 456.
6. 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980).
7. Id. at 1686.
8. Id.
9. Id.

10. Id.
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sergeant arrived on the scene and read the defendant his rights for the
second time. A captain of the same force then arrived with other officers, and he also read the defendants his rights. At this point, the
defendant stated that he understood his rights and that he wished to
see a lawyer."
The defendant was then placed in a patrol car accompanied by
three officers. He was to be driven back to police headquarters while
other officers remained at the scene of the arrest to search for the missing shotgun which had been used in the robberies.' 2 En route to the
police station, two of the officers began a conversation centering on
the shotgun.' They expressed concern over the possibility that one of
the local handicapped school girls might find the shotgun and hurt
herself." ' The defendant, apparently moved by the thought of a small
child finding the gun and being injured, directed the officers to return
to the arrest scene so that they could remove the shotgun from the
area. The officers turned back after having traveled approximately one
mile. "I
The officers returned to the scene of the arrest where a search of
the area was in progress. At this time, the captain read the defendant
his "Miranda rights" for the fourth time.' 6 The defendant again stated
that he understood his rights and subsequently led the police to a nearby field where they found the shotgun.' 7
The defendant was found guilty of kidnapping, robbery, and
murder by a jury on March 20, 1975. On appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reversed the conviction,"8 concluding that the defendant had been "interrogated" after he had requested counsel.' 9 The
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The conversation was between Officer Gleckman and Officer McKenna. As
Officer Gleckman later testified:
At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I
frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped
children is located nearby], there's a lot of handicapped children running around
in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they
might hurt themselves.
Id.
While Patrolman Williams, the third officer in the car, said nothing, he overheard
the conversation between the two officers and testified, "[h]e [Gleckman] said it would
be too bad if the little-I believe he said girl-would pick up the gun, maybe kill
herself." 100 S. Ct. at 1687.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18.

State v. Innis,

19.

Id. at

,

-

R.I.

__

, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978).

391 A.2d at 1162.
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court found that Innis had been subjected to subtle coercion as a result
of the conversation and that the coercion constituted the functional
20
equivalent of questioning in a police dominated atmosphere. The
court also found that the evidence did not support a finding that the
defendant had made a clear and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel and therefore remanded the case for a new trial. The court also
2
ordered suppression of the evidence obtained from the defendant. '
2 2 to determine the
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
definition of "interrogation," and in its decision reversed the Rhode
Island Supreme Court by holding that no interrogation of Innis had
taken place. 23 The Court's holding, however, was expressly limited to
the issue of interrogation. 2 '
III.

THE COURT'S HOLDING

The United States Supreme Court ruled that a two-pronged standard is be used to determine whether a suspect had been interrogated
under Miranda which included not only express questioning, but also
any words or actions on the part of police, other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody, which the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.II
According to the Innis Court, the Rhode Island policemen did not
violate the first prong of the definition because the conversation did
not directly involve the defendant nor was a response from him invited. 26 Moreover, the defendant was not subjected to the functional
equivalent of questioning because, as the Court noted, there was
nothing in the record to show that the patrolmen were aware that the
defendant would be susceptible to an appeal concerning handicapped
children, or that the policemen knew the defendant was unusually
disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. 7 Finally, the record did
was particularly evocative as the defennot show that the conversation
28
dant had contended.
"Express questioning," the first prong of the Court's standard is
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
23. 100 S. Ct. at 1691.
24. The Court stated early in its decision that because it had determined that the
defendant had not been interrogated within the meaning of the definition developed by
the Court, it did not need to decide the issue whether the defendant had in fact waived
his right to be free from interrogation until counsel was present. 100 S. Ct. at 1688 n.2.
25. Id. at 1689.
26. Id. at 1690.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1691.
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largely self-explanatory. Sustained and protracted questioning, either
by itself or coupled with forms of physical or psychological abuse, can
undermine a suspect's will to resist. 9 It was to this type of evil which
the Miranda decision was addressed. 3"
Next in the standard, the Court delineated the qualifying phrase
"other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody" which
specifically excepts many routine police procedures from being held to
be the equivalent of interrogation. General on-the-scene questioning of
witnesses,3" and questioning directed toward routine background information of a suspect 3" are examples of questioning not designed to
elicit incriminating responses.3 3 The phrase also relates to the Court's
reaffirmation of the admissibility of a volunteered confession by a
suspect. A confession made "voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." 3 , The Court limited this
assertion because the fact of being taken into custody by the police, by
itself, places a measure of compulsion on the suspect to speak. 3 5 The
procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are not required merely
because a suspect is taken into custody, but rather are required when
the suspect is subjected to interrogation during that custody.3 6 For this
reason, not all statements obtained by the police after the suspect is in
custody are considered to be the product of interrogation. Interroga29. See, e.g., California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (companion case of
Miranda wherein the suspect was questioned nine times over the five days subsequent
to arrest); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (police resorted to physical
brutality along with questioning to extort a confession); People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d
235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965) (police brutally beat, kicked and placed
lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under interrogation).
30. 384 U.S. at 499.
31. State v. Bohanan, 220 Kan. 121, 551 P.2d 828 (1976).
32. See 384 U.S. at 477; United States v. Massey, 437 F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Fla.
1977).
33. See Note, The Applicability of Miranda to the Police Booking Process, 1976
DUKE L.J. 574.
34. 384 U.S. at 478. The Innis Court limited the phrase "without any compelling
influences" to compelling influences other than those inherent in police custody itself.
100 S.Ct. at 1689 (emphasis added).
35. The United States Supreme Court recognized this in an earlier opinion: "[A]ny
interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it,
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system
which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime." Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
36. In Miranda, the Court suppressed only those statements obtained through
custodial interrogation. By this, the Court required two threshold determinations: (1)
that the suspect be "in custody," defined as being deprived of freedom in any significant way; and (2) that the questioning be initiated by law enforcement officers. The
import of this ruling is that neither custody nor interrogation alone can trigger the requirement to read a suspect his Miranda rights; rather, both requirements are
necessary. 384 U.S. at 444.
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tion, therefore, is not at issue unless there exists a measure of compulsion beyond that inherent in police custody itself.37
The second prong of the Court's standard includes police action
that is the functional equivalent of express questioning. Thus, Miranda
recognized that a suspect is often placed in situations where there may
be no direct questioning, but where subtle persuasive techniques indirectly bring about the result that express questioning is prohibited
from so doing. The Court gave examples of persuasive techniques as
recognized in the Miranda decision. One such example is a "coached
witness line-up" in which the witness picks out the suspect so as to
begin interrogation with the apparent assumption by the examiner that
the suspect is guilty in fact, and that the remaining information is obtained merely to reinforce that decision. Another is the "reverse lineup" in which the police again use a coached witness to pick out the
suspect as one who has committed a separate fictitious crime. The object in this situation is to induce the suspect to confess to the actual
crime in return for assurances that he will not be prosecuted for the second crime. 8
The above situations constitute interrogation because they consist
of words or actions which the police should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response. It was the Miranda Court's concern
to prohibit these techniques because, by their very nature, they are the
functional equivalent of express questioning."
This concern is illustrated in the second prong of the Innis Court's
37. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
38. For other examples of techniques used see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) (interrogators induced a confession by representing to defendant that an accomplice had implicated him); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 388 A. 2d 218 (1978) (interrogators gained suspect's confidence by suggesting excuses for his conduct and by
minimizing his moral blameworthiness by assuring him that most people would have
done the same thing in similar circumstances). See generally INBAU & REID, note 4,
supra. Note, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and the Relinquishment of Constitutional Rights, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 109 (1978).
39. The Court in Miranda illustrated this point graphically:
In essence [the setting] is this: to be alone with the subject is essential to prevent
distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in
his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story
the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistance, at times relentless
questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must 'patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective
may be obtained.' When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the
police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity
about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him
out of exercising his constitutional rights.
384 U.S. at 455 (footnotes omitted).
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definition of "interrogation." The Court focused upon the suspect's
perceptions of the situation to determine whether he had been "interrogated," rather than concentrating on the objective intent of the
police." ° The Court restricted, however, the application of this half of
the definition to the foreseeable results of the words or actions.4 1
After 'eviewing the facts of the case, the Court stated that there is
a difference between "a few off-hand remarks '4 2 and "a lengthy
harangue '4 3 in the presence of a suspect. The words chosen by the
police in this instance were not ones which they should have known
would elicit an incriminating response. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court erred in equating the "subtle compulsion" brought on by the
mere presence of the officers with the compulsion experienced during
interrogation."
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that although
the result is not inconsistent with Miranda, the uncertainty produced
by using the majority's test would not assist in clarifying the body of
post-Mirandadecisions. An evaluation of the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused at the time of arrest to determine whether certain
words or actions would result in incriminating responses is one that
45
few, if any, police officers would be competent to make.
In the first dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, substantially agreed with the majority's definition of "interrogation," ' 6 but reached the opposite conclusion. Justice Marshall
centered on the distance traveled, 7 the timing of the conversation of
40. By changing the focal point of the inquiry, the Supreme Court did not
preclude completely evidence of police intent, for it may have a bearing on whether the
police should have known their actions would evoke the desired response. "In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the
accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should
have known was reasonably likely to have that effect." 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7.
41. Id. at 1690.
42. Id. at 1691.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Chief Justice Burger noted that even psychiatrists, when asked to determine
which words or actions might influence a suspect, would need to employ many question and observation techniques in order to make the type of judgment which police
officers must make. Id.
46. Justice Marshall stated:
[Iun my view, the Mirandasafeguards apply whenever police conduct is intended or
likely to produce a response from a suspect in custody. [Tihe Court's opinion ...
is equivalent, for practical purposes, to my formulation, since it contemplates that
'where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should
know was reasonably likely to have that effect.'
100 S.Ct. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. The patrol car had traveled approximately one mile from the scene of arrest.
Id. at 1687.
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the officers,"8 and the content of the conversation in noting that the
situation constituted more than a "few off-hand remarks" as the majority had characterized them. Instead, Justice Marshall believed that a
strong appeal to the suspect's conscience was involved. 9
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued that the
definition of interrogation should include any police statements or
conduct that has the same purpose"0 or effect" as a direct question.
Otherwise, if it appeared that a certain suspect was not susceptible to a
particular type of psychological pressure, the police would be free to
exert that pressure on him despite a request for counsel, as long as they
did not ask express questions.5 " By Justice Stevens' standard, the
holding of the Rhode Island Supreme Court that an interrogation took
place should have been affirmed because the officers' statements were
as likely to elicit a response as direct questions."
48. The conversation apparently began almost immediately because the patrol car
turned around within a few minutes of leaving the arrest scene. Id.
49. Justice Marshall distinguished cases where police officers speaking among
themselves were accidentally overheard by a suspect, because in Innis the officers were
in close quarters with the suspect. Therefore, they would have had to know that the
suspect would hear and attend to their conversation as they traveled past the very place
they believed the weapon was located. In addition, the conversation centered on not
just an innocent bystander, but an innocent, helpless, handicapped little girl. Id. at
1692 (Marshall, J. dissenting). In this regard, Justice Marshall presents a factual situation analogous to the now famous "Christian Burial Speech" in Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, the suspect in an abduction-murder incident was arrested and arraigned in Davenport, Iowa, and transported back to Des Moines in the
company of two police officers. The officers were in close quarters with the suspect,
and knew that he would hear and attend to their conversation. They traveled past the
place where they believed the body was located and the conversation centered on a
strong emotional appeal based on the suspect's known deeply religious convictions. In
both Williams and Innis, the suspect was advised of his rights several times and had exercised these rights.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on Brewer in part to establish that Innis
had been interrogated, just as Williams had during the "Christian Burial Speech." The
Supreme Court, however, distinguished Brewer from Innis by referring to the sixth
amendment grounds that Brewer was decided on (right to counsel) as opposed to fifth
amendment grounds upon which Innis was decided (right against compulsory selfincrimination). The Supreme Court also stated that the definitions of "interrogation"
were not necessarily interchangeable since "the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct." 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
50. Justice Stevens required that the intent of the police be included in any definition of interrogation. Id. at 1695. "I would assume that police often interrogate
suspects without any reason to believe that their efforts are likely to be successful in
the hope that a statement will nevertheless be forthcoming." Id. at n.8.
51. "Statements that appear to call for a response from the suspect, as well as
those that are designed to do so, should be considered interrogation." Id. at 1695
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1696.
53. Justice Stevens enumerated three different ways in which the police officers in
Innis could have communicated their fears concerning the dangers of the hidden
shotgun to handicapped children.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/11
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Even if he had joined with the majority, however, Justice Stevens
would have remanded the case to the Rhode Island courts to apply the
new standard at the trial court level. The trial court had only assumed
that an interrogation had taken place in order to raise the waiver
issue. 5' Thus, Justice Stevens would not have decided the case as a
matter of law after the Court had formulated a different standard than
the one used to decide the case in the lower courts."
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

The Innis Court in its definition of interrogation, set a minimum
threshold to be met for the determination of whether there is sufficient
compulsion present to constitute interrogation of a suspect. The majority chose the phrase "other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody" 5 6 to convey the idea that "subtle coercion"" exists
whenever a suspect is arrested and placed in custody. It is the compulsion which is greater than that which is incident to arrest and detainment which triggers the protection mandated by Miranda.58 Thus, the
Supreme Court differed from the Rhode Island Supreme Court which
had attached great significance to the "subtle compulsion" and the intentional effort on the part of the police to evoke an inculpatory
response. In their analysis of the circumstance of Innis' arrest, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on Brewer v. Williams. 9 In
He could have:
(1) directly asked Innis: Will you please tell me where the shotgun is so we can
protect handicapped schoolchildren from danger?
(2) announced to the other officers in the wagon: If the man sitting in the back
seat with me should decide to tell us where the gun is, we can protect handicapped children from danger.
(3) stated to the other officers: It would be too bad if a little handicapped girl
would pick up the gun that this man left in the area and maybe kill herself.
[This is substantially what was said in the patrol car to Innis].
In my opinion, all three of these statements should be considered interrogation
because all three appear to be designed to elicit a response from anyone who in
fact knew where the gun was located.
Id. at 1695. Justice Stevens cited White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a
Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (1979), in which
the author proposed and applied the same test which in essence stated: Since the conversation indicates a strong desire to know the location of the shotgun, any person
with knowledge of the weapon's location would be likely to believe that the officers
wanted him to disclose its location. Thus, a reasonable person in Innis's position
would believe that the officers were seeking to solicit precisely the type of response that
was given. 100 S.Ct. at 1695.
54. Id. at 1687.
55. Id. at 1696. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1689.
57. Id. at 1687.
58. The majority states that "[t]he Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, in short,
in equating 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation." Id. at 1691.
59. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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Brewer, the detective made the famed "Christian Burial Speech" with
"the specific intent to elicit incriminating statements." '6 0 This intent
was a key factor in Brewer, and was stressed by Justice Stewart in the
majority opinion, 6 ' and by Justices Powell and Marshall in separate
concurring opinions.6 2 The Supreme Court in Innis, however, required
further inquiry into the finding of "subtle compulsion" and evidence
of police intent. 3
The Innis Court distinquished the case before it from Brewer in
two ways. First, the specific intent of the detective to extract an incriminating response in Brewer differed markedly from the "casual ' 6'
conversation between the accompanying officers in Innis,"' during
60. 430 U.S. at 403. The Des Moines officer, Detective Leaming, knew that the
suspect Williams was a former mental patient, and that he was deeply religious. During
the 160 mile drive to Des Moines, Detective Learning engaged Williams in conversations covering a wide variety of topics until they reached the interstate highway. Addressing Williams as "Reverend," the detective said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road....
Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting,
it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early
this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you
yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself
may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way
into Des Monies, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of
this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas Eve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and
locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out
after a snow storm and possibly notbeing able to find it at all.
Id. at 392.
Detective Leaming knew that Williams was represented by two attorneys, one in
Des Moines and one in Davenport, the place of arrest, yet the detective intentionally
sought to isolate Williams from both so as to obtain as much incriminating information as possible (as evidenced by the detective's refusal to allow Williams' attorney to
ride in the car with Williams back to Des Moines).
Counsel for the State of Iowa acknowledged that the "Christian Burial Speech"
was tantamount to interrogation:
Q: But isn't the point, really, Mr. Attorney General, what you indicated earlier,
and that is that the officer wanted to elicit information from WilliamsA: Yes, sir.
Q: -by whatever techniques he used, I would suppose a lawyer would consider
that he were [sic] pursuing interrogation.
A: It is, but it was very brief.
Id. at 399 n.6.
61. Id. at 399.
62. Id. at 408, 412.
63.
64.

100 S. Ct. at 1691.
Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion disagreed with characterizing the

conversation as "casual." Id. at 1690. See generally notes 32 and 33 supra.
65. In the words of the Court: "[T]he record in no way suggests that the officers'
remarks were designed to elicit a response ....

It is significant that the trial judge,

after hearing the officers' testimony, concluded that it was entirely understandable that
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/11
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which the suspect overheard the officers' well-grounded fears." The
suspect's response in Innis was made not from statements intentionally
aimed at him, but rather from that elusive "subtle compulsion" which
was present from having been placed in custody and informed of the
situation surrounding the incident.6" Second, the Innis Court noted
that Brewer was decided by reference to the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution relating to assistance of counsel whereas Innis rested on the fifth amendment right against compulsory selfincrimination as interpreted by the Miranda opinion." Thus, the
Supreme Court sought to remove all influences brought by Brewer into
the Rhode Island court's opinion, and, thus remove any inference that
"subtle compulsion" should be linked to such intentional police conduct as in Brewer.
The Supreme Court in Innis, as well as in Miranda, stated that interrogation encompasses not only express questioning, but also any
words or actions by the police which they should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. The latter portion of the definition was qualified by the Court's assertion that it
focused on the perceptions of the suspect rather than on the intent of
the police.69 In this manner, the Court further separated the applicability of Brewer to Miranda situations, and added another pillar
of support to its decision not to accept the Rhode Island court's
reliance on Brewer." Discounting the inquiry into police intent seems
[the officers] would voice their concern [for the safety of the handicapped children to
each other]." 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.9 (emphasis in original).
66.

See State v. Innis,

_

R.I.

__

, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978) (Kelleher, J., dissent-

ing). Justice Kelleher characterized the fears as well-grounded in that the patrolman
who had initiated the conversation, Officer Gleckman, often patrolled the area in
which the school was located and near which the shotgun was located.
67. The Rhode Island trial judge stated:
I think it is entirely understandable that they [the officers] would voice their concern
to each other. And I have to say that I commend the defendant for responding to the
danger which, more than likely he did not know of up until that time ....

So the

defendant responded out of a very commendable concern to a situation that he
became acquainted with.
-

R.I.

__,

391 A.2d at 1163.

68. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
69. Until this decision, the majority of courts have used the Brewer definition of
interrogation which focuses on the intent and purpose behind police conduct. See,
e.g., United States v. Jordan, 557 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1977) (police officer intended to
elicit an incriminating response); Oregon v. Turner, 32 Or. App. 61, 573 P.2d 326
(1978) (definition of interrogation included all police conduct designed to elicit
statements from defendants in custody, including acts of inducement and persuasion);
Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969) (any question likely or expected to elicit a confession by police constituted interrogation).
70. The Court buttressed its position by asserting that "[t]his focus reflects the
fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an
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strained, however, because the Court impliedly incorporated the
Brewer intent inquiry when it used such phrases as "an added measure
of protection against coercive police practices," 7 ' and a practice "that
the police should know is reasonbly likely to evoke an incriminating
response."" The use of the term "practice" indicates, by itself, a certain amount of predetermined intent by the police; otherwise isolated
methods or incidents could not take on an aura of established procedures. The Court recognized this and qualified its position by declaring that "where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating
response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also
be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to
have that effect." 73
The Court limited the applicability of its new definition by restricting its application to foreseeable results of words or actions by police;
that is, ones that they should have known were likely to produce an incriminating response."4 This is an attempt by the Court to exclude any
off-hand remark made by an arresting officer which, though unintended,
nevertheless produces an unforeseeable inculpatory response from
a suspect.7" This limitation, however, encompasses more than the
Court had intended because it embraces not only unintended conversations, but also conversations which are intended but are not likely to
work. 76 The police may now evaluate the effectiveness of their interrogation techniques, abstain from using those which are likely to produce an incriminating response and use other objectionable techniques
on any suspect in custody. This would be permissible as long as they
do not use one that is judged likely to work on a given suspect because
of his special circumstances. Put simply, the police may argue, based
on proven statistics, that a certain practice is not likely to produce inadded measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police." 100 S. Ct. at 1690.
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 1689 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 1690 n.7.
74. "The police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of
their words or actions." Id. at 1690.
75. The use of the term foreseeable broadens the scope of judicial inquiry by requiring determination of whether the situation was (1) a foreseeable result from a
foreseeable manner, (2) a foreseeable result from an unforeseeable manner, (3) an unforeseeable result from a foreseeable manner, or (4) an unforeseeable result from an

unforeseeable manner. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 43 at 250 (4th ed. 1971).

76. This argument is pointedly brought out by Justice Stevens' acknowledgement
that many offenders would not be moved by certain police techniques: "Indeed, since I
suppose most suspects are unlikely to incriminate themselves even when questioned
directly, this definition will almost certainly exclude any statement that is not punctuated with a question mark from the concept of 'interrogation'." 100 S. Ct. at 1695
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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culpatory statements, and is, therefore, outside the ambit of the
Court's standard even if it does produce incriminating statements."
It is not clear whether the Court meant for the new standard to be
entirely subjective from the suspect's point of view,7 8 or objective in
the minds of the police. 9 In either case, the new standard may prove
hard to apply in a field situation because the police will have to
evaluate the suspect in custody to determine whether he will be suspectible to the practices contemplated, and then decide which practices
will be deemed prohibited and which will be "safe." If indeed one
must look into the mind of the suspect, it would appear that the conversation by the Rhode Island officers further enhanced an already
coercive atmosphere; an atmosphere that Miranda sought to dispel."
A more direct path would be to more fully reduce a coercive atmosphere to adopt an objective standard which requires the police to
refrain from saying anything to a suspect in custody who has invoked
his "Miranda rights." In this manner all actions by poiice, whether
direct questions, statements that would be reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response, or any conduct that had the same purpose or
effect as a direct question would not add to the inherently coercive,
police dominated atmosphere.8"
In the mind of a suspect who is in custody, any attempt, whether
intended and reasonably likely to suceed, intended but not reasonably
likely to succeed, or unintended, increases the coercive atmosphere to
some degree. This is precisely what Mirandaand its progeny attempted
to prevent. 8"
77. Id.
78. This subjectiveness is evidenced by the words "[t]he latter portion of this
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect .... " Id. at 1689-90.
By focusing on the suspect's perceptions, the Supreme Court has begun a potentially
dangerous precedent. Claims based on the psychological weaknesses and strengths of
the accused may be brought to establish impermissible interrogation, requiring a "battle of the psychiatrists" between the prosecution and the defense to determine the outcome. See Comment, Interrogation in Violation of Miranda/ State v. Innis, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 591 (1979).

79. The second prong of the majority's definition states that "[wiords .. . that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect." 100 S. Ct. at 1689 (emphasis added).
80. "In the cases before us today.., we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring." 384 U.S. at 456.
81. The latter standard, that of conduct having the same effect as a direct question, was proposed by Justice Stevens in broadly construing the functional equivalent
of interrogation. "In my view any statement that would normally be understood by the
average listener as calling for a response is the functional equivalent of a direct question, whether or not it is punctuated by a question mark." 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
82. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of incustody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
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CONCLUSION

By reversing the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the Innis Court expanded the latitude that police will have in their interrogation of

suspects in the field. The delineation of a standard less strict than that
advocated by Justice Stevens removes some situations from the effect

of the exclusionary rule8 3 by holding, as a matter of law, that a
criminal suspect will not be likely to respond to indirect humanitarian
appeals, 8" or, in the alternative, that police should have no reason to
believe, absent special knowledge, that a suspect would be susceptible
to those same appeals.8" The Innis majority has opened the door for
police comments concerning an alleged incident to be used in the

presence of a suspect, as long as the police are careful not to ask an express question or to employ a tactic which they should know is
reasonably likely to produce an inculpatory remark. The action taken

by the Innis court, however, was not wholly unpredictable in light of
86
the recent trends of the Court.
By centering on the perceptions of the suspect rather than on the
intention of the police, Innis has made it easier for an accused to raise
the defense of coercion. Instead of being required to prove through
objective evidence that the police intended to elicit information, the
defendant may focus on the psychological effect of the situation in
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures, and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
384 U.S. at 467.

83.

The exclusionary rule is a remedial device judicially created to protect guaran-

teed legal rights. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Its

purpose is to deter unconstitutional police conduct by barring the introduction of
evidence obtained in disregard of an individual's rights. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 466 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

84.

100 S. Ct. at 1697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

85. For an example of knowledge of special susceptibility, see note 60 supra.
86. For a number of cases illustrating the gradual restriction of Miranda, see
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (interrogation subsequent to cessation of first
interrogation not in violation of Miranda merely because defendant asked to see his
lawyer; second interview had no relation to subject matter of first interview, and state
had scrupulously honored defendant's rights concerning the first interview); Orgeon v.
Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements taken in violation of Miranda excluded in the
state's case-in-chief, but could be used to impeach defendant's testimony); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that only the recommended procedural safeguards of Miranda had been violated but not the defendant's fifth amendment rights;'
therefore the doctrine did not attach). See generally Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1978);
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99.
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which he found himself, and open the inquiry to claims based on his
mental strengths and weaknesses. This could ultimately culminate at
trial in a battle of the psychologists between the prosecution and
defense.8 7 The new definition will become unmanageable for the police
officer who attempts to pattern his* actions on the new standard
because he must now evaluate the psychological make-up of a suspect
in the short time available to him in the field to determine whether
anything said or done will be likely to affect the suspect, and which
could ultimately result in the exclusion of evidence. At the same time,
the officer must perform the duty he owes to the public to obtain admissions of guilt by avenues left open by the Innis definition. The Innis
Court did keep in mind the overall public policy favoring conviction of
truly guilty defendants by implicitly ruling that some police practices
have an effect too subtle to have made a difference on a confession
made while in custody.88 Those confessions, in a practical sense, are
made "without any compelling influences," 89 and are, therefore,
voluntary within the meaning of Miranda.
To more adequately protect the accused's right against compulsory
self-incrimination, it would be preferable to fashion a per se rule which
requires that once a suspect is in custody and has invoked his rights, all
conversations concerning the alleged incident should be made out of
the suspect's presence. An objective standard would not require police
to remain absolutely silent in the presence of a suspect, but it would
recognize the compulsion acknowledged by Justice Stevens in his
dissenting opinion.90 The pressures, however, sought to be dispelled by
Mirandaare clearly present in the mind of the accused in custody when
police are surrounding him and are audibly reflecting on the incident.
By not laying down a concise and unambiguous definition of "interrogation," the Innis court requires future case by case determination
of the foreseeable effects of certain police practices rather than informing the police exactly what practices they may or may not employ in
87. See note 78 supra.
88. See note 34 supra.
89. The Supreme Court in Innis, as well as in Miranda,stated that "[c]onfessions
remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." 100 S. Ct.
at 1689 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)).
90. See note 81 supra. The requirement of absolute silence is one concern that
Justice Kelleher voiced in his interpretation of the Rhode Island majority's holding. He
feared that, in effect, the suspect would then be entitled to a fifth Miranda warning
which would read: "the police, while in the company of a suspect who has been given
his Miranda rights, shall remain silent at all times even among themselves; otherwise
what they say to each other may be used to reverse a criminal conviction." R.I.
__,391 A.2d at 1167 (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
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their work. The risk of having evidence suppressed on appeal may
eventually prompt the police to watch what is said after a suspect is apprehended, but this will be a slow development. This will only occur
after a sufficient number of cases have been reversed by a court's hindsight analysis in determining that what the police did not in fact
foresee, should have been foreseen; an analysis that few can predict
with any certainty. An objective test would not only be easier to administer, but would also place police on notice as to conduct proscribed by foresight rather than hindsight.
Michael Edward Susco
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